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Abstract 
Social engineering is a topic that is briefly covered in today’s system administration and security 
coursework.  With emphasis primarily on securing and administering computer network 
technologies, ample time has not been given to discussing how to administer the users.  In 
addition to their technical training, administrators need to comprehend the potential severity and 
likelihood of social engineering attacks.  Teaching administrators how to minimize the risk of 
hacking attempts or computer virus infections does not fully equip administrators with the 
knowledge to defend their networks.  Administrators need to be able to answer the question of 
how they can also mitigate the risk of social engineering attacks against their network.   
 
To properly answer the question of how to mitigate the risk of social engineering attacks, several 
facets of social engineering needed to be discussed to fully understand how it works.  These 
topics include the: 
• Definition of social engineering 
• Human factors social engineers exploit 
• Motivation for using social engineering 
• Types of social engineering attacks 
Defining social engineering was necessary to have a firm basis of what is social engineering.  
For the context of this thesis, social engineering is defined as using subversive tactics to elicit 
information from end users for ulterior motives.   
 
Research into exploitable human factors is necessary to understand how social engineers think.  
Understanding concepts such as friendliness, authority, or helpfulness enable administrators to 
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devise methods to protect themselves, and their users, from having these traits exploited.  These 
traits were defined to give a clear picture of what attackers look for in an individual when 
planning their method of attack.   
 
Methods of attack were researched to clearly define attack types and make administrators aware 
of how attacks are typically carried out.  By knowing these methods, best practices for 
administrators can be determined.   
 
A three vector approach is necessary to successfully combat social engineering attacks.  Using 
this approach, administrators must focus on: 
• Creating best practices for themselves 
• Training users on the dangers and methods of social engineering 
• Reviewing organization’s policies and procedures 
The creation of best practices for administrators allows administrators to have a checklist of 
items to ensure proper protection.  This best practice guide covers physical security 
implementations, personnel security measures and network security hardware, software and 
policies.  All three levels of security must be given equal assessment to ensure there is no weak 
link in the security chain.   
 
Training end users, part of the personnel security best practices, is very crucial if administrators 
are going to successfully mitigate the risk of social engineering attacks.  The users need to have a 
knowledge transfer of what social engineering is, how attacks can happen, and what needs to be 
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done if an attack occurs.  Like any emergency preparedness training, users must be reminded 
time and again of the risk of attack and precautions to take.   
 
In today’s age of digital security, it is the users who pose the weakest link to information security 
and computer networks due to their lack of knowledge of the potential risk.  Armed with the 
knowledge of social engineering methods and tactics, administrators can be better equipped to 
protect their networks from attack.  Apart from understanding the knowledge themselves, an 
administrator must be able to train the end users about the dangers of social engineering.  Today, 
ensuring a fully protected computer network cannot be done by administrators alone.  It takes the 
entire organization to realize each individual is responsible for ensuring information security.  By 
implementing best practices, conducting regular training classes, and auditing current policies 
and procedures for compliance, accuracy, and effectiveness, system administrators can mitigate 
the risk of any social engineering attack. 
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Introduction 
Network and systems administrators are faced with the potential of having to deal with any 
number of network attacks.  These attacks may come in the form of viruses, worms, hackers, 
malware, and “bot nets.”  When it comes to these types of attacks, administrators have a number 
of tools at their disposal to defend their network.  For example, routers can be deployed utilizing 
Network Address Translation (NAT) to hide their systems from the external Internet.  For 
filtering and blocking, administrators can employ high-end firewalls to block unsolicited traffic 
or Access Control Lists (ACLs) to block traffic from unwanted locations. With all these tools in 
place, many administrators feel they are adequately protected, from attack.  At the very least, 
they feel if an attack is to happen, they would be notified immediately and be ready to act.  The 
problem with this heavy reliance on technology is that administrators now focus solely on the 
technology to solve their problems.  As information security author Bruce Schneier stated, “If 
you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t understand the problems 
and you don’t understand the technology” (Schneier, Secrets & Lies, 2002, p. xxii). 
 
The problem administrators face today when dealing with security is not a technical one.  Kevin 
Mitnick emphasized this after attending his first Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) conference: 
“No sessions were offered covering physical attacks or social engineering.  You could 
spend a fortune purchasing technology and services from every exhibitor, speaker and 
sponsor at the RSA Conference, and your network infrastructure could still remain as 
vulnerable to old-fashioned manipulation” (Mitnick K. , 2001). 
The issue revolves around the human aspect of the network, not the technological aspect.  Like 
any system, it is only as strong as the weakest link (Schneier, Beyond Fear, 2006).  With today’s 
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advances in network security, humans are now the weakest link in the chain.  Attackers have 
time on their side.  Attackers can take as long as they want in planning out their attacks.  These 
attackers will plan out their attacks and attempt to go for the weakest link in the security chain 
with the hopes of gaining the most information or inflicting the most damage.  In contemporary 
networks, this weakest link is the end user him or herself (Orgill, Romney, Bailey, & Orgill, 
2004).  Routers, firewalls and other defenses are meaningless if an attacker is standing in front of 
a client’s machine, or worse, gains physical access to the server room.  If an attacker can exploit 
a user to gain information, administrators need to devise new measures to secure their networks 
and data.   An administrator’s arsenal of network security tools and software is rendered useless 
if those tools can be circumvented simply by the attacker walking through the organization’s 
front door. 
Social Engineering Defined 
When attackers focus on the human element of a computer network, they typically employ social 
engineering tactics.  Social engineering relies predominately on establishing and exploiting trust 
(Russell, et al., 2003).  By building trust with an individual the attacker may be able to gain 
privileged information he or she would not otherwise be able to attain.  The ultimate goal of a 
social engineering attack is to gain direct access to the targeted information system (Thornburgh, 
2004).  Successful social engineering attacks allow attackers to gain the information they want 
without having to resort to hacking.  Based on what social engineering attempts to accomplish, 
when dealing with computer network administration, the following definition of social 
engineering can be surmised: using subversive tactics to obtain information from an individual or 
individuals for nefarious uses against a computing system. 
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Why Use Social Engineering? 
With social engineering defined, the next question to ask is why would one conduct such an 
operation in the first place?  Lafrance (2004) identifies four distinct motives that may drive one 
to conduct a social engineering attack. 
• Economic Profit 
An attacker may see the information that could be obtained as a quick means of 
earning money whether by attempting to then blackmail the victim or sell the 
information to the highest bidder. 
• Personal Interest 
An attacker may simply be curious as to what goes on with an organization and 
see social engineering as the best means to obtain information without causing 
alarm. 
• Revenge 
Former employees, competitors, or someone who disagrees with a corporation’s 
business or its practices may resort to social engineering in an attempt to damage 
the corporation or its reputation. 
• External Pressure 
External pressure may come from other hackers where hacking is viewed as a 
game to see who can obtain the most information or do the most damage for 
notoriety within the group or subculture. 
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What Social Engineers Prey On 
Before one can understand and attempt to identify the tactics social engineers may employ, it is 
important to understand what human traits social engineers prey on to exploit their victims.  The 
research by Robert Cialdini (2001) gives insight into just these traits.   
 
In his book, Influence, Cialdini (2001) listed several innate human conditions that practitioners 
of social engineering will prey on (and exploit any combination of) to gain a victim’s trust in an 
effort to obtain desired information.  The six conditions described are: 
• Reciprocation 
• Commitment 
• Social Proof 
• Friendliness 
• Authority 
• Scarcity 
 
Reciprocation 
Reciprocation is one of the most influential rules ingrained into the human culture.  This rule 
states that people should attempt to repay what another person has provided to them (Cialdini, 
2001).  When provided with a good or service, the human response is to feel a sense of debt to 
the provider, so they do not later feel a sense of guilt for getting something for nothing.  In most 
cases of receiving goods or services, this debt is repaid in monitory amounts.  Exploiting this rule 
is easy and one of the most common tactics used by social engineers.  The reciprocation rule is 
exploited so often due to the overpowering strength it has over people.    
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Besides being an overpowering influence on the human psyche, the reciprocation rule also can 
result in unequal exchanges of favors or information (Cialdini, 2001).  This unequal exchange is 
typically displayed when a person feels indebted to another.  In the course of paying back their 
debt, the person will pay (monetarily or by actions) more than is owed to relieve their feeling of 
guilt.  Exploiting reciprocation requires the social engineer to make the first move during the 
attack (rather than waiting for the victim to engage the attacker).   
 
Commitment 
Commitment is another human condition social engineers prey on.  This condition suggests once 
a person makes a decision, he or she feels a sense of responsibility, whether intrinsically or 
extrinsically, to commit to it.  Social engineers use this to their advantage in numerous ways to 
coerce their targets into divulging sensitive information.  If the target has already been answering 
questions from the attacker, divulging unnecessary information for future attacks, he or she will 
feel a sense of pressure when finally asked a question where the answer will yield important 
information.  For example, an attacker could ask a series of questions about a particular 
employee.  Anything from when the employee goes to lunch, how long they take lunch, etc.  The 
attacker could finally ask the office number of the employee.  While all this information seems 
benign, the attacker now has now compiled a window of opportunity to search the employee’s 
office for useful information. 
 
Social Proof 
“The principle of social proof states that one important means that people use to decide what to 
believe or how to act in a situation is to look at what other people are believing or doing” 
(Cialdini, 2001, p. 140).  If an attacker is trying to gain information from several individuals 
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within an organization, he or she can use the concept of social proof to further coerce someone 
into divulging information.  By instilling a sense of conformity upon the victim, the victim will 
be more likely to believe others have done what the attacker is asking him or her to do (Manjak, 
2006).  For instance, the attacker may create a form that asks for the individual’s computer logon 
credentials, which are needed for an annual security assessment.  Upon presenting the form to 
the target, the attacker may say “Many of your coworkers [dropping names of other members in 
the organization to help legitimize the request] have already completed this form, it is necessary 
for you to please do the same.”  The victim, now presented with proof (albeit false) of his or her 
coworkers’ compliance, now feels more at ease thanks to the (false) assumption that others have 
followed suit in filling out the faux security assessment form.  Social proof is very effective 
when the victim is not around his or her peers.  Without being able to confirm the attacker’s 
statements, lone victims can be more easily persuaded to divulge information than those who are 
within a group (Orgill, Romney, Bailey, & Orgill, 2004). 
 
Friendliness 
People tend to be more responsive to others whom they are friendly with and like.  This increase 
in responsiveness aids attackers aiming to exploit the friendliness condition.  Responsiveness 
means that people will be more willing to say “yes” to requests from friendly acquaintances.  
Due to this likelihood, an attacker utilizing social engineering will compliment and befriend a 
target during their interactions.  A person is more willing to divulge information to someone who 
is kind, social, and courteous.  
 
A receptionist at an organization may be the most likely target for the friendliness exploit due to 
his or her job as the effective gatekeeper to the other members within the organization in addition 
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to high visibility and ease of access.  For example, an attacker will walk in mentioning how he is 
late for a meeting with an executive within the organization.  He cannot remember the office or 
phone number of the higher up and asks the receptionist for the executive’s information, 
remembering to be polite and smile.  Whether the receptionist is male or female, the attacker will 
attempt to interject a compliment to further the friendliness façade.    
 
Within the concept of friendliness lies the idea of similarity and familiarity.  Increased 
familiarity with someone and discovery of similarities are factors that lead people to like another 
(Cialdini, 2001).  During attacks that take several months or more, the attacker can put the victim 
at ease by remaining in contact, being friendly, or finding (or more commonly falsifying) 
similarities between the attacker and victim.  The more at ease and friendly the victim is with the 
attacker, the more likely he or she will be willing to give up proprietary information. 
 
Authority 
The concept of authority lends itself to obedience (Cialdini, 2001).  When someone is seen as an 
authoritative figure, others will follow the figure’s rules, requests, or orders for one of two main 
reasons:  
• Hope of reward 
• Fear of reprimand 
Social engineers strive to illicit responses based on these two stimuli.  To do so, one must first 
convey the sense of authority.  People associate several visual cues with authority status: 
• Titles (such as director, president, sergeant, professor, or dean) 
• Money 
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• Clothing 
• Automobiles 
Having (or pretending to have) any combination of these and other status symbols allows a social 
engineer to feign a higher authority and increase the chances of getting sought after information.  
Arriving to a target organization in a freshly pressed suit and stepping out of an expensive car 
will help convey the sense of authority and therefore the assumption that the attacker is 
privileged to otherwise inaccessible information.  The same is true over the phone (or computer) 
if the attacker uses managerial titles such as “Director of Information Security” or “Manager of 
Information Systems.” 
 
Scarcity 
Scarcity affects people every day thanks to advertisements on television and on the Internet 
claiming limited inventory.  People are bombarded every day with advertisements claiming, “Act 
quickly, supplies limited!” or “Hurry, this is a limited time offer!”  (The advertisements 
themselves are examples of social engineering, but in the pursuit of corporate profit, not 
necessarily deception). Cialdini’s scarcity rule states, “…people assign more value to 
opportunities when they are less available…. The scarcity principle holds for two reasons.  First, 
because things that are difficult to attain are typically more valuable….  Second, as things 
become less accessible, we lose freedoms” (Cialdini, 2001, p. 231).   
 
Nefarious social engineers will use the same tactics as their legitimate counterparts.  A social 
engineer may set up a bogus website offering a rare, once in a lifetime available item on sale for 
a very low price. This website will be in the form of either a fake online retailer, or more 
deceptively, a recreation of a legitimate online retailer.  A person, enticed by the offer and the 
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thought of being one of a few people to own such a rare item, buys the item, sending the social 
engineer his or her name, address, and credit card information.  In return, the buyer receives a 
false receipt.  Meanwhile, the attacker quickly buys multiple items with the newly acquired 
credit card information.   
Attack Vectors 
Building upon these six human conditions, Charles Lively, Jr., (2004) states social engineers 
prey on and utilize four primary attack vectors: 
• Carelessness 
• Comfort Zone 
• Helpful 
• Fear 
These attack vectors help link what social engineers prey on to the types of attacks social 
engineers will use. 
 
Carelessness 
The carelessness vector is exploited by having victims fall prey to their own false sense of 
security.  Not properly disposing of sensitive material or not following security guidelines allows 
an attacker to exploit a victim’s carelessness and gain access to potentially damaging 
information.  Carelessness often aids social engineers in pre-social engineering attacks when 
they are in the planning phase of the attack and need information on how to gain the more 
lucrative information during the main attack.  Lively (2004) states, “[Carelessness] is often the 
first phase of a more complex overall attack” (p. 2). 
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Comfort Zone 
A victim’s comfort zone is exploited only after the attacker has made the victim at ease both with 
the attacker and the environment.  By being in a more comfortable, relaxed state, the victim’s 
threat perception is lowered, making it easier for an attacker’s exploit to succeed.  This vector 
relies heavily on locations to conduct the attack such as a victim’s office.  Friendliness and social 
proof conditions are more easily exploited via the comfort zone vector.  These attacks are more 
commonly used from within the organization.  A survey conducted in 1998 found that up to two-
thirds of all social engineering attacks emanate from within an organization (Lively Jr., 2004).   
 
Helpfulness 
The helpfulness vector exploits the victim’s compassionate side.  Relying on the notion that 
people generally want to help another  (Jones, 2003), attackers will pose as someone in need of 
assistance in an attempt to solicit information.  Posing as a new employee, the attacker may ask 
where certain resources are located throughout the organization, such as the server room or 
security office. Both of these locations should be red flags that a potential social engineering 
attack is taking place. 
 
Fear 
The fear vector exploits a victim by exploiting the emotions and states that make up fear, such as 
anxiety and stress.  Lively states the fear vector is often the most aggressive type of attack a 
social engineer can perform (Lively Jr., 2004).  Using the fear vector often means exploiting the 
victim’s conditioned sense of authority and preying on the victim’s fear of reprimand.  Social 
proof exploits also help in these scenarios as victims want to be seen as team players and can be 
fearful of not being seen in such a light by their peers. 
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Ultimate Goal for Successful Attacks: Trust 
 
The previous human conditions and attack vectors social engineers exploit and utilize all build 
up to one ultimate goal (aside from gaining information): trust.  If the attacker can gain the trust 
of the victim, the attacker will have a much easier time obtaining any information he or she 
desires.  The more a person trusts another, the less likely they are to have their suspicions raised 
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002).  Once the attacker has the trust of the victim, the hard work of the 
attack is over.  The attacker can now ask for more information while raising little, if any, 
suspicion on the victim’s part.    
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Taxonomy of Social Engineering Attacks 
Focused on exploiting the above human characteristics and learned social behaviors, social 
engineers have come up with many intuitive ways to trick their prey into divulging information.  
Social engineering attacks typically combine any number of methods in hopes of obtaining as 
much information as possible.  While commonly used in a combined state, the attack types 
themselves can be categorized into several distinct methods with unique features. 
Dumpster Diving 
Technically, dumpster diving is not considered a method of social engineering since there is no 
human interaction while gathering data.  Even so, it warrants mentioning as it can play a vital 
role in deciding which type of future social engineering attack (or attacks) to use.  Dumpster 
diving is defined as searching through, or “diving”, through the trash of a person or organization 
in an attempt to gain potentially useful information (Authurs, 2003).  Names, phone numbers, 
email addresses, physical addresses, credit card numbers and other personal or proprietary 
information can be easily obtained by one or more dumpster diving sessions.   
 
While it is in the attacker’s best interest to stay hidden during a dumpster diving session, so as to 
not to blow his or her cover for future attacks, in most cases the would-be attacker does not have 
to worry about any legal issues if spotted.  In the Supreme Court decision of California v. 
Greenwood (1988) the Court found that the fourth amendment prohibiting warrantless searches 
does not apply to trash left outside of a residence or Curtilage (an enclosed area on property but 
not housed within a building).  The Court’s ruling stated that Mr. Greenwood relinquished the 
right to reasonable expectation of privacy to any belonging he put into the trash.  As a result of 
this case, people are free to inspect one’s trash for any useful items or information.  The only 
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exception to this expectation of privacy is if the trash is on private property with posted “no 
trespassing” signs (Robinson, 2007).     
Pharming 
Pharming is an example of a passive attack where the victim comes to the attacker.  Pharming is 
the recreation of an otherwise legitimate website, such as a bank or online retailer.  The goal is to 
trick the victim into thinking he or she is on a real, legitimate site and have the victim enter 
confidential information.  Depending on the type of website, this could be one’s social security 
number, credit card information, or username and password for a legitimate website (Filte, 
2006).   
 
Setting up the malicious website is typically not enough for an attack to be successful.  For the 
ruse to be completely hidden, attackers may opt to make the address of their website appear 
legitimate too.  This deception could be accomplished via several means.  The most common 
methods involve registering a domain name with a slight variation on the legitimate website’s 
address or using a different domain name suffix.   
 
An even more intrusive pharming attack would compromise files locally on the victim’s 
computer.  By editing the “hosts” file of the computer (limiting the range of the attack only to 
machines that are compromised), or by exploiting Domain Name Service (DNS) servers, 
attackers can  create false domain records so that the legitimate DNS entries for a given website 
direct victims to a malicious website’s IP address (otherwise known as DNS poisoning).  By 
compromising the DNS server(s), attackers will be able to bring many more users to their 
website, since any requests the DNS server(s) receives for the legitimate website will be 
redirected to the fraudulent website. 
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Figure 1 shows how this type of pharming attack is conducted. 
  
Figure 1 - How Pharming Works 
 
(Chaudhari, 2006) 
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An example of pharming would be a malicious site of www.bankofamerica.net instead of the 
correct www.bankofamerica.com.  When a user arrives at the bankofamerica.net website, he or 
she should not see much difference to the legitimate .com site.  Unaware of this being a 
pharming site, the victim inputs his or her confidential information (username/password/credit 
card number) as well as identifiable pin number(s) to gain access to the site.  After submitting the 
information, the malicious website may report an error saying the page temporarily cannot be 
found due to technical errors.  More advanced websites may even pass the information to the 
legitimate website and forward the user to the site.  Either way the victim is unaware of falling 
victim to the attack. 
Phishing 
Phishing is arguably the most common computer based form of social engineering.  Unlike 
pharming, where the attacker waits for the victim to come to him, phishing attacks seek out the 
victim (McQuade III, 2006).  These attacks typically prey on the friendliness and scarcity human 
conditions.  Phishing is most commonly attempted through email but can also come in the form 
of an instant message, phone call, or even in person.  In almost all attempts, the attacker 
impersonates someone to exploit the idea of authority and gain the victim’s trust and acceptance.   
 
The most common examples of phishing are the Nigerian email scams.  These scams usually 
involve a supposed high-ranking member of an organization or government based in Nigeria 
stating a large sum of money is available to the victim due to some odd circumstances.  All the 
victim needs to provide is specific personally identifiable information.  Typically this 
information consists of, but is not limited to a name, social security number, checking account 
and routing numbers, and address.  In some cases, the victim is even asked for a modest sum of 
money in advance for “processing fees.” 
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Figure 2 shows an example of a phishing email received by the author during the research of this 
thesis. 
 
Figure 2 - Phishing Email Example 
From: mrabiidebe0@citcotrust-online.de 
Sent: Tuesday, November 06, 2007 9:28 PM 
To: ********************* 
Subject: I Request Your Urgent Consent 
 
Dear Friend, 
  
I am Mr. Abii Debe, staff of Citco Trust & Finance House Accra Ghana,I am the  
Credit management and recovery manager with the Company office in Ghana before  
I was transferred to our head office here in Abuja Nigeria, Late Engineer  
Wilson was my personal Client before he died in an accident, he was a  
contractor with Shell Development Company and he is from your Country. 
  
On the 21st of April 2004, Engr. Wilson, his wife and their two children  were  
involved in a car accident along Platue express road and  all occupants of the  
vehicle unfortunately lost their lives. Before  the time of his death, he had  
a deposit of $14.5 Million which he declared as family treasure in the Finance  
House Accra office where I was working then, which is only I and his lawyer  
knows the true content, Unfortunately, till this moment no person has come as  
his relation for  his chattels with us. I humbly request your attention to  
this matter so that I can present you as his next of kin and beneficiary to  
his chattels. It is not a very difficult thing to do and it will not take  
time.  
  
All I will need is to put your name and particulars as his next of kin to  in  
our computer database and we file in an application for the release of the  
fund in Ghana to conclude the deal, we may request that the money be sent to  
Europe for your collection.  
  
Please contact me as quickly as possible through this email address  
(ab_debe21@yahoo.com.hk) treat this matter as very important and confidential.  
  
When I hear from you, we shall discuss the terms of sharing of the money after  
the claim. Contact me now so that I can delegate the Attorney who is also  
going to be part of the deal. 
  
I await your urgent response. 
  
Best regards, 
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Mr. Abii Debe 
 
 
This email has several signs of being a phishing scam.  First, there are constant grammatical 
errors and punctuation mistakes.  A second red flag is the reply email address.  The sender says 
he is located in Nigeria, yet the email address ends in the suffix ".hk" which is the domain for 
addresses emanating from Hong Kong.  Finally, the use of a “Yahoo!” email address when the 
sender says he works for a division of Citco Trust is yet another item to note.   
 
The email in Figure 3 goes one step further and even details what information is desired from the 
victim.   The attacker could then easily commit identity fraud if the victim provided all of the 
requested information. 
 
Figure 3 - Phishing Email Example 2 
From: worthsman kalvin [worthsman_kay1@yahoo.com] 
Sent: Saturday, July 21, 2007 12:46 PM 
To: ****************** 
Subject: part time worker needed 
 
Hello, 
My name is Worthsman Kalvin and I am an artist.I live in England,with my two  
kids and the love of my life. It is definitely a full house. I have been doing  
artworks since I was a small child when i was in Canada , that should give me  
about 23 years of experience. I majored in art at high school and took a few  
college art courses. 
Most of my work is done in either pencil or airbrush mixed with color pencils. 
I have recently added designing and creating artwork on the computer. 
I have been selling my art for the last 4 to 5 years and have had my work  
featured on trading cards,prints and in magazines.I have sold in galleries,  
museums and to private collectors from all around the world. 
I am always facing serious difficulties trying to sell my art works to  
Americans and Canadians,they are always offering to pay with a US POSTAL MONEY  
ORDER,which is difficult for me to cash here in England. 
I am looking for a representative in the states or Canada who will be working  
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for me as a partime worker and i am willing to pay for every transaction,which  
wouldn't affect your present state of work,Basically someone who would help me  
receive payments from my customers in the states/Canada  .i mean someone that  
is responsible and reliable,because the cost of coming to the states and  
getting payments is very expensive,Presently i am working on setting up a  
branch in the states and Canada, but for now i need a representative in the  
united states who will be handling the payment aspect. 
These payments are in money order and they would come to you in your name,so  
all you need to do is cash the money order deduct your percentage and wire the  
rest back.But the problem i have is trust,But i have my way of getting anyone  
that gets away with our money,I mean the Security gets involved.It wouldn't  
cost you any amount,you are to receive payments which will be sent to you by  
fedex or ups from my business partners,which would come in form of a money  
order then you are to cash it and send the cash to me via western union money  
transfer. All western union charges will be deducted from the money. 
If you are interested your percentage is 10% out of any transaction , please  
provide this information below as this assures our partnership. 
 
FIRST NAME-------- 
LASTNAME-------------- 
ADDRESS-------- 
CITY------------ 
STATE--------------------- 
ZIP CODE---------------- 
COUNTRY---------------------- 
PHONE NUMBER (S)--------------------- 
GENDER------------------ MARITAL STATUS------------------- 
OCCUPATION----------------------- 
AGE-------------------- 
NATIONALITY------------------ 
 
Regards 
Susana 
BEACON ST,BIRKBY, HUDDERSFIELD, 
WEST YORKSHIRE HD2 2RS, 
Worthsman 
Phone--+447024095475 
  
  
 
Pretexting 
Pretexting is a technique used by many social engineers.  The United States government defines 
pretexting as “the practice of getting personal information under false pretenses” ( Pretexting: 
Your Personal Information Revealed, 2006).  Pretexting is used in phishing and pharming attacks 
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since the people behind the emails and websites are not actually part of the legitimate 
organizations they claim to be a part of.  BecauseNot all social engineering attempts are made 
under false pretenses.  Therefore social engineering is not synonymous with pretexting.   
 
Quid Pro Quo 
The Latin word, quid pro quo, is defined as “something for something.”  When used for social 
engineering purposes, the attacker promises the victim something in return for cooperation.  This 
method is often aided by an impersonation, where the attacker will pretend to be another worker 
within an organization (mixing in pretexting techniques).  If necessary, the attacker will 
impersonate a superior if the attack is not in person (preying on the realm of authority).  The 
attacker’s goal is to make the victim feel as if he or she will benefit from helping the attacker 
complete his or her goals.  These goals are often not seen as malicious in nature to the victim, 
while the “reward” is seen as very tantalizing. The classic example of a quid pro quo attack 
comes in the form of a survey.  Manjak (2006) explains why surveys provide such an easy means 
for staging a social engineering attack,  
“Surveys are an information gathering instrument tailor made for attackers.  They require 
no special relationship between the attacker and the victim, and are by their very nature 
designed to elicit information in a question and answer format” (p. 9). 
 
In a notable study, organizers of the Infosecurity Europe conference conducted three surveys 
from 2006 through 2008 asking random people in London, England if they would divulge their 
work usernames and passwords in return for a chocolate candy bar.  The organizers also hired 
attractive females to administer the survey to further entice people.  After reviewing the data, the 
surveyors discovered that in 2006, 81% of people surveyed were willing to give up their 
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passwords in exchange for a candy bar.  In 2007, that percentage decreased to 64%.  In 2008, the 
percentage dropped again to 21% out of 576 people asked (Infosecurity Europe, 2008).  While 
the research shows there are many people willing to part with sensitive, private, and potentially 
damaging information, these surveys also suggest that people are beginning to be more cautious 
when giving out personal information.  However, it must be noted that the organizers were not 
able to determine if the usernames and passwords recorded were legitimate.  
 
Reverse Social Engineering 
Reverse social engineering aims to gain information by having the victim ask the questions 
rather than the attacker.  Typically, when employing this type of attack, the attacker will don the 
persona of an authority figure within the organization.  Utilizing this authority characteristic can 
yield a great deal of information to the social engineer based on the questions asked by the 
victim.  
 
Reverse social engineering attacks are one of the hardest types of attacks to perform due to the 
time and patience necessary to properly prepare one’s self to step into the authority figure’s role.  
A social engineer needs to make his or her ruse believable to the victim or else he or she will be 
exposed.  Employing this attack method usually means having to give up some information to 
ensure the victim never knows an attack took place.   
 
Malcolm Allen (2007) describes a reverse social engineering attack as being comprised of three 
parts: sabotage, marketing, and support.  With sabotage, the attacker will attempt to corrupt or 
give the appearance of corruption to a user’s workstation or other device.  The attacker will then 
use marketing to ensure the victim contacts the attacker by leaving business cards or by name 
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dropping.  Once contacted, the attacker will then switch into support mode and “assist” the 
victim with the problem while gaining the desired information. 
 
A typical scenario for reverse social engineering involves the attacker impersonating a member 
of an organization’s Information Technology (IT) helpdesk.  Selecting his or her victim, the 
attacker may sabotage the victim’s computer.  This sabotage can be as simple as unplugging the 
user’s network cable.  The attacker will then make himself or herself known to the victim as the 
person who can help fix the computer’s problem.  A simple, “Hi, I’m Henry, the IT guy, can I 
help you?” will do.  Once the attacker is in direct contact with the victim, the final phase, 
support, or assisting, begins (Dubin, 2003).  Throughout the conversation, the attacker listens to 
and attempts to answer questions asked by the victim. As the victim asks questions related to the 
issue, the attacker can gain valuable information that may aid in further attacks.  When ending 
the dialog with the victim,, the attacker fixes the victim’s computer problem, obtains the desired 
information and break contact.  The victim is unaware of the attack because his or her computer 
is back up and operational.  Additionally, a trust has been established between victim and 
attacker that could be used for further information gathering attacks.   
 
Shoulder Surfing 
Shoulder surfing is the act of watching what someone is typing or doing on the computer by 
watching the screen (or keyboard) with or without the victim’s knowledge (Robinson, 2007). 
The act of shoulder surfing itself is not a true form of social engineering, as the attacker is not 
actively engaging the victim (Allen, 2007). Even so, other social engineering methods are used 
to lead up to this attack, as the attacker needs the victim’s trust and must make the victim feel at 
ease to allow the attacker to get so close.  Attackers find it difficult to walk up and shoulder surf 
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without a sense of trust by the victim.  This action will almost surely cause the potential victim to 
ask what on the attacker’s motive is and why the attacker is standing behind them.  Gaining the 
victim’s trust, engaging the victim in conversation and finding (or creating) similarities between 
attacker and victim will increase the chances of this attack succeeding.  As the victim falls into a 
false sense of trust around the attacker, he or she will be less likely to notice, or care, if the 
attacker happens to be watching what he or she is typing into the computer.  Once this trust is 
established, the attacker only needs to watch for usernames, passwords, or other valuable 
information, and then disappear.   Once again, the victim has no idea an attack has taken place. 
 
Trojan Horse/Gimmies 
Trojan horse attacks, also known as “gimmies,” aim to exploit the victim’s curiosity as well as 
exploit the victim’s sense of scarcity.  Trojan horse attacks are unique in that they may never 
require contact (directly in person or indirectly via email) to be accomplished.  The attack is 
performed by leaving something the victim will find as valuable laying around such as a CD or 
flash drive.  The item is the Trojan Horse.   
 
While at first sight it appears to be nothing more than a harmless piece of technology, it is the 
software contained on it that is a danger.  Prior to planting the device in a location where the 
victim will find it, the attacker will load any number of malware utilities on it.  These utilities 
include key loggers, spyware viruses, root kits, etc.  Once the victim finds the item and inserts it 
into his or her computer, the software will automatically install and/or activate without the 
victim’s consent or knowledge.  The scarcity condition is exploited when the victim picks up the 
item after seeing it lying in an inconspicuous space.  The victim’s curiosity is exploited when the 
victim puts the device into his or her computer to see if there is any data on the device.   
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This exact scenario was tested in June of 2006 by Secure Network Technologies Inc. during a 
security audit of a credit union.  Twenty USB flash drives were preloaded with a Trojan Horse 
that would collect user’s passwords, logins, and computer system information and then email 
that information back to the auditors.  The USB drives were placed in various areas throughout 
the credit union’s parking lot.  After letting the “attack” go for three days, the auditors found that 
15 out of the 20 flash drives were found by credit union employees and were plugged into the 
company computers, giving them access to all the information they would need to further 
compromise the stability and security of the credit union’s network (Stasiukonis, 2006).    
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Mitigating the Risk  
Armed with the knowledge of what human conditions social engineers exploit during their 
attacks, as well as the methods they use, administrators can begin to mitigate the risk of social 
engineering attacks.  In devising such methods, administrators must first determine the value of 
the data they are trying to protect.  Administrators must also understand the difference between 
risk and threat when dealing with prioritizing their data.  Administrators must take into account 
users’ daily needs to create a ratio of usability to security. As Schneier (2008) has stated: 
“Procedures are a tough balancing act. If they're too lax, there will be security problems. 
If they're too tight, people will get around them and there will be security problems” 
(Schneier on Security - People and Security Rules). 
Only after understanding a risk verses a threat can administrators effectively implement security 
measures that would be best suited for their environment.   
Determine Value 
One key detail administrators must first review is determining what has value in their 
organization.  Administrators should learn to think beyond the traditional terms of value such as 
a computer costing $2,000 to replace.  In addition to such asset values, one needs to think of 
what the data they manage could be worth.  Most organizations tend to underestimate the value 
of their data, only to realize this error after an attack (Gragg, 2002).   
 
Determining the value of information and resources will help prioritize the level of protection 
given to the information. By prioritizing and ranking systems by a value metric, administrators 
can better allocate safeguards and countermeasures to protect them.  Administrators should also 
look at the cost to secure a resource vs. its estimated value.  If the cost to secure a resource 
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greatly outweighs the value of the resource itself, it may not be in the best interest of the 
organization to spend the money to protect it (Dubin, 2003).   
Risk vs. Threat 
The difference between risk and threat is very important for an administrator to understand.  Not 
fully grasping the definition of these terms can lead to weak security measures that will not 
provide adequate safeguards when tested.    
Bruce Schneier (2006) identified risk and threat as the following: 
 “A threat is a potential way an attacker can attack a system” (p. 20). 
A risk takes “into consideration both the likelihood of the threat and the seriousness of a 
successful attack” (p. 20).  
To summarize, the threat is the type of attack that can be used, while the risk is the chance or the 
probability that the attack will occur and be successful. 
 
In today’s post 9/11 world, think of the threat as a terrorist attack.  The media constantly states 
how another terrorist attack is a threat to the United States.  The risk, however, can vary greatly.  
For instance, a terrorist attack would be more likely to occur in Washington, D.C. than Bismarck, 
ND.  Therefore, it can be said that the risk of a terrorist threat is greater in Washington, D.C. than 
in Bismarck. 
 
This same reasoning is used when dealing with social engineering.  In a new startup 
organization, there is the threat that someone could use social engineering to discover the 
username and password of a given employee; however, the risk of such an attack is low because 
the company is fairly new and unknown.  The argument could be made that the risk of a social 
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engineering attempt against an employee of a high profile, well established company is greater 
than that of a company that was created recently.   
 
Administrators need to evaluate the data to be protected and place values on it.  Using the 
information’s determined value will help in deciding risk if the information were to be 
compromised.  Higher value information may be at greater risk from the same attack than lower 
value information.  Establishing these criteria is what will lead to being able to apply the 
necessary security measures on the appropriate data.  
Security Measures 
If a Systems Administrator is to protect the assets of his or her network, he or she must think like 
an attacker.  What data would be sought?  Which people would easily give up information?  
These questions should be asked and answered before any specific policy or procedure is put in 
place.  Even after policies or procedures are implemented, administrators must still remember 
that they and their network are never one hundred percent protected.  When it comes to social 
engineering, the administrator must strive to mitigate every attack attempt.  An attacker need 
only be successful once. 
 
To combat social engineering attacks, an administrator’s best practices guide has been developed 
and have been divided into three separate categories: 
• Physical Security 
• Personnel Security 
• Digital Security 
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These three categories, working from the top down should form a shell around valuable network 
resources and data, as seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 - Best Practice Security Model 
 
 
This “onion” layered approach to mitigating the risk of social engineering attacks aims to ensure 
that if the outer layer of protection is broken, the damage an attack can cause will be limited to 
that layer and stopped before access to network resources has been achieved.  Once network 
security measures have been breached, an attacker will have access to any and all desired 
information. 
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Best Practices 
Detailed practices and procedures that can be implemented are broken down under each of the 
three security layers.  A quick reference version of these best practice guidelines can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Physical Security 
Physical security includes all physical entry and exit points to the facility, including exterior 
building access as well as access to network resources such as datacenters and wiring closets.  
These assets must be protected and monitored to ensure only properly authorized personnel can 
gain access.  Being vigilant and ensuring only authorized personnel have permission helps to 
lower the risk of physical security breaches stemming from social engineering attacks.  
 
Physical security should employ multiple means to secure and monitor all entrances to a facility.  
Such methods and tools are: 
• Auto locking doors 
• Closed Circuit video surveillance equipment 
Utilizing auto locking doors provides a failsafe against users.  These types of doors help to 
alleviate the user forgetting to lock entrance ways that lead to sensitive areas or resources.  Auto 
locking doors can be classified as the counterparts to the auto lock feature on a user’s 
workstation, ensuring no one can access network resources without proper access in the event the 
user forgets to lock his or her workstation while away.  
 
Administrators should emphasize the danger of tailgating users when entering or exiting secured 
locations.  Attackers may attempt to exploit an individual’s courtesy of holding a door open for 
someone in hopes of entering an unauthorized area (Brainard, Juels, Rivest, Szydlo, & Yung, 
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2006).  Users may find it rude to let the door shut behind them when another individual is trying 
to pass through the door as well.  This tactic further ensures the locking doors are not defeated 
via any social engineering attempt. 
 
• Photo identification (ID) badges 
Issue ID badges that incorporate copy protection countermeasures, such as printed 
holograms or microscopic text.  These badges should also contain technology such as 
mag-stripe or RFID encoded information linked the user’s name and access permissions 
to grant/deny the user access to various areas throughout the organization. 
 
• Biometric access devices 
Using biometric access devices such as hand scanners or retina scanners offer another 
level of security that has proven to be very difficult, but not impossible to defeat.  Using 
this technology in tandem with photo ID badges establishes a multifactor authentication 
scheme for ensuring a secure physical environment. 
 
• Security cameras 
Security cameras add a logging mechanism to physical security.  Not only can video 
recordings provide a log of successful logins and logouts of users from the premises, but 
they also serve to review the events leading up to, during, and after an attempted or even 
a successful breach of physical security. 
 
• Visitor badges 
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Badges should be issued to every visitor that enters the premises, no matter how trusted 
the individual is.  Assigning visitor badges to every visitor establishes an auditable policy 
that shows all visitors are accounted for during their visit. 
 
• Sign-in sheets 
In addition to visitor badges, guests should be required to fill out a sign-in sheet, or 
visitor log, recording, at a minimum, their name, organization they are from, who they 
are visiting, their time checking in, and their time checking out (see Appendix C for an 
example sign in sheet).  Sign-in sheets provide an auditable log of all visitors to the 
organization and provide information on who in the organization is accountable for a 
given visitor.  An example visitor log with recommended fields can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
Personnel Security 
Strong personnel security is critical, as it is the last barrier before physical access to a network.    
There are several policies that can bolster the effectiveness of personnel security. 
• Protect user information 
Inform users not to give out their personal information or others’ via the Internet in 
person, or over the phone to unknown parties.  If someone calls asking for an associate 
who is unavailable, instruct users not to tell the caller how to contact the individual.  
Instead instruct users to ask the caller for callback information and to provide that 
information to the individual once he or she is available.   
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• Conduct background checks on potential employees 
Background checks should be conducted on all potential new employees before they start 
to check for criminal records and get a better idea of the character and ethics of the 
individual (Dolan, 2004).   
 
• Training 
Training the members of an organization helps to support both the physical and digital 
security measures.  Training personnel on what signs to watch out for that could signal an 
attack and what information is acceptable to give out is crucial.  Sample training course 
outlines are discussed in the “User Workshop” section of this paper.   
 
Prior to implementing personnel training, meetings with leadership should be held to 
reviewing what the organization deems as sensitive information.  Meeting hosts should 
review steps organization members should take to verify a person’s identity before 
granting anyone access to material or information.   
 
Digital Security 
The final barrier in mitigating social engineering attacks is the digital one.  Securing the network 
is the administrator’s last hope of stopping an attack from.  Administrators should employ 
multiple security measures to make it as difficult as possible for an attacker to successfully 
infiltrate the network.  At the very least, such measures should be: 
• Strict password policies 
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Ensure passwords meet a predetermined complexity requirement.  Also, force users to 
change their passwords at a predetermined interval to ensure compromised passwords do 
not become a significant liability.  Establishing a policy on password delivery retention 
will ensure users cannot soon reuse a password (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
 
Randomly generated passwords consisting of a variety of key types (i.e., capitals, special 
characters, and numbers) and at least 8 characters in length are considered very secure 
from a technological perspective, but are not necessarily secure from a user perspective.  
When working with most users, the more complex a password becomes the less secure it 
may become.  For example, the password “1_Lik3_T@c03s!” can be considered to be 
more secure from a user perspective than “&G9f4jh8%vcS,” as it meets typical password 
complexity requirements as well as can be easily remembered compared to the second, 
randomly generated password.  While the second password is more secure from a 
technical perspective, it illustrates the dilemma of how the more complex a password 
becomes, the less likely users will remember it.  If they cannot easily remember their 
password(s), users will resort to writing it down; defeating is purpose of being secure.  
Social engineers know this.  The classic location to check is for a sticky note stuck under 
one’s keyboard, or worse, on the side of a user’s monitor.   
 
In an everyday environment, it may be better to compromise.  Dissuade users from 
choosing easily guessed passwords such as birthdays or a pet’s name.  At the same time, 
provide users with tips to make secure, easy to remember passwords.  Suggest users 
substitute numbers for letters, such as using 3 instead of E.  Another simple solution is to 
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recommend users reverse the password string to make it less likely to be guessed by an 
attacker or broken by a password cracking program, utilizing brute force or dictionary 
based attacks. 
 
• Strict firewall rules 
Configuring and maintaining strict firewall rules helps to keep an attacker out.  Ensure 
content filters are up to date when utilizing website blocking technology to help prevent 
users from stumbling across websites that could be a source of Trojan Horses or are 
known pharming sites. 
 
• Strong email filtering 
Setting up and maintaining email spam filters will further ensure users do not become 
prey to phishing attacks, chain emails, viruses, or worms that could harm or steal 
personal information. 
 
• Multifactor authentication 
Multifactor authentication, commonly implemented as two-factor authentication, 
provides challenges to ensure the user is allowed access.  In two-factor authentication, a 
user is challenged with what he or she knows and what he or she has.  Under this method, 
the user (determined by the username) must enter what he or she knows (e.g., a 
password) and provide information on what he or she has (e.g., a token that generates a 
key string). 
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Incorporating two-factor authentication via the use of a token such as a SafeWord or RSA 
token helps to protect users in the event their username and password are compromised.  
Even with their account information in the wrong hands, the risk of that information 
leading to a further breach is unlikely without the acquisition of the security token.   
 
To establish three-factor authentication, the user must also provide information pertaining 
to who they are.  This third authentication step can incorporate biometric security, as 
discussed in the physical security section of this paper. 
 
• Strong (128+bit) encryption 
For sensitive information, protecting it with at strong encryption scheme of at least 128bit 
provides another safeguard against information tampering.  Encryption should be used 
whenever possible, if the data warrants it, to ensure the data’s confidentiality if it were to 
fall into unauthorized hands.  Encryption should also be used to secure websites, emails, 
VPN tunnels, hard drives, or any resource that can be accessed from outside the physical 
location. 
 
• Limited wireless network access (none if possible) 
Wireless network access significantly increases the risk of a breach by removing the need 
to be on the premises to access the local network.  If a social engineer were able to obtain 
a user’s login credentials, he or she would not even need to step foot into the building if a 
wireless access point was present.  If the need for wireless access cannot be avoided, then 
several steps should be taken to mitigate the risks it creates.  First, use a strong encryption 
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method such as WPA 2.  WEP has proven far too easy an encryption protocol to break.  
In independent testing, weaker WEP key strings (64bit WEP keys) were able to be 
passively sniffed and cracked within several minutes (Kaliburn, Sienkiewicz, & 
Spinapolice, 2007).  Second, choose a strong passphrase, similar to a password, but 
typically longer, to be used with the encryption method.  Third, use a RADIUS server to 
help authenticate users onto the wireless network.  Finally, segment the wireless network 
onto its own subnet or VLAN.  This subnet should be created especially if the wireless 
network will be available to visitors and provide only limited internal network access. 
 
• Access control lists 
Create policies to manage and enforce access control lists.  Whether device-based, role-
based, or user-based, access controls are one of the final lines of defense against losing 
information.  Ensuring people do not have global access to important information helps 
mitigate the risk that a user’s stolen credentials will compromise the entire network.  It 
cannot be said enough that administrators need to ensure devices and users are only 
granted access to the information they need and nothing more.  Users should never be 
granted administrative rights to their own workstations, no matter how tech-savvy they 
claim to be.  Even the administrator should not use the administrator or root account 
unless it is explicitly necessary.  Do not use these accounts for day to day activities. 
 
Implementing and maintaining these policies and procedures at the administrative level will 
greatly lower the risk of a successful social engineering attempt on one’s network.  To ensure 
these policies and procedures remain a strong deterrent to social engineers as well as strong 
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protection against attack attempts, administrators still need to provide adequate training to users 
to ensure they follow similar best practices in protecting the network.  Establishing guidelines for 
future audits to test the policies and procedures will further solidify their effectiveness by 
revealing any weaknesses in the current setup.  The audit results will then aid in rectifying any 
discovered issues.   
 
User Training 
 
In addition to following their own best practices, administrators need to ensure users are aware of 
the practices and that they obey security guidelines.  If users do not see administrators following 
their own best practices, then the users will follow suit (Dubin, 2003).  To combat a weak 
security atmosphere, administrators should develop several strategies to train and remind users of 
the danger of attacks and best practices on how to mitigate them.  One method of preventing 
users from letting their guards down is to educate them as to what social engineering is and how 
to protect against it is via a series of communication, training, and awareness workshops 
(Twitchell, 2006). 
 
These user workshops enable the administrators to teach users signs to look out for regarding 
potential attacks and what to do when they identify them.  Mitnick (2002) states: 
“The central goal of any security awareness program is to influence people to change 
their behavior and attitudes by motivating every employee to want to chip in and do his 
part to protect the organization’s information assets” (p. 250). 
Before any training begins, it is recommended that the entire IT  staff, including helpdesk 
personnel, network/systems administrators and IT security personnel,  be introduced to the users.  
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In doing so, administrators can reduce the risk of an impersonation attack where an attacker may 
pose as a helpdesk worker or other staff member.  Far too often the network support staff is 
segregated from the rest of the organization’s population. 
 
Manjak (2006) argues, “Employees will not be motivated to change behaviors if they see no 
reason to change” (p. 12).  During user training sessions, Mitnick (2002) notes one way to 
motivate users to protect an organization’s information is to make them understand that doing so 
not only helps protect the organization but also themselves, since the organization retains 
personal information about all employees.  This point is particularly important with payroll 
information containing salaries, social security numbers, and contact information.   
 
During these training sessions, administrators should cover four basic topics: 
• Social engineering terms 
When gauging users’ knowledge of social engineering, Gross and Rosson (2007) 
found while many users knew terms such as phishing, none had heard of social 
engineering nor did they fully understand its meaning.  To this end, users must be 
educated as to what social engineering is and what aspects of the human condition 
social engineers prey on.  Simply being aware of such information will begin to 
make users more vigilant in their day-to-day activities. 
 
• Types of social engineering attacks 
The training should highlight to users various attack methods, starting with the 
most common attacks such as phishing and pharming.  Other methods, such as 
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reverse-social engineering, may require a role playing demonstration to fully 
illustrate the to the user the anatomy of such an attack. 
 
• Ways to defend against attacks 
After users understand the types of attacks and how they occur, administrators 
must review prevention methods.  This section of the training session can focus 
on various techniques pertaining to the best practices security model (see Figure 
4). 
 
• Steps to take when an attack is suspected 
Emphasize that while the goal is to prevent an attack, security can never be one 
hundred percent effective.  In light of this, users should be instructed to notify 
support staff when they think an intrusion is taking place.  Typically, the 
personnel to be notified would be the network administrative and security teams.  
If the attack is happening in person, advise users to notify any onsite security 
personnel. 
 
Classroom-Based Course 
 
To further examine the benefits and structure of a social engineering training session, the author 
collaborated with an instructional design consultant at ICF International, located in Fairfax, 
Virginia.  The goal laid forth was to devise an outline for a classroom-based course to educate 
employees with little to no knowledge of social engineering methods and attacks.   
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Course Objectives 
 
Three main objectives for the course were isolated. By the end of this training session, learners 
will be able to: 
1. Recognize social engineering techniques. 
2. Describe techniques for mitigating the risks of social engineering attacks. 
3. List security rules of the organization. 
4. Describe the importance of following corporate security policies, practices, and 
procedures. 
Course Layout 
 
The devised course was broken down into four main sections: 
1. Introduction and knowledge transfer 
2. Class participation and activities 
3. Review of organization’s rules and policies 
4. Objectives review and Q&A 
Introduction and Knowledge Transfer 
 
The course would commence with introductions from the security, systems and network team, 
allowing employees to put names to faces and know who manages the organization’s IT 
infrastructure.  Definitions of social engineering would follow accompanied by reasons 
employees should care about and be aware of social engineering attacks.  Students would be 
taught the various human conditions attackers attempt to exploit as well as methods employed to 
exploit said conditions.   
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Group Participation Activities 
The activities section of the course would open with several case studies of successful attacks.  
Details and examples would be given describing the attacks, including information attackers 
were after, methods used, and their motivation for the attack. 
 
Several questions were devised to ask to the class after each case study to verify participants 
understand the anatomy of the attack and can actively devise ways to identify and prevent the 
attack.  Three such questions are: 
1. What was the objective of the social engineering attack? 
2. What techniques were used? 
3. How could the victim(s) have prevented the attack? 
4. What would you do if you detected or suspected this attack in your office? 
 
Review of Organization’s Rules and Policies 
After the case studies and class discussions, review of the organization’s policies and procedures 
would commence.  Types of sensitive information that could be compromised would be 
discussed.  Additionally, incentives for following rules in addition to consequences for lack of 
compliance would be disseminated to the group.  
Objectives Review and Q&A 
Following the review of the organization’s policies, students would be asked to answer questions 
reviewing the objectives of the course. Students would be asked to define social engineering in 
their own words as well as to describe steps they would take to prevent themselves from falling 
victim to an attack.  
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Following the course review, the floor would be open to questions and answers by the class.  The 
questions would be directed to both the instructor as well as the network and systems 
administrators.   
Course Length and Recurrence 
In discussion with the instructional designer, it was agreed that such a proposed course would 
last for approximately two hours in length.  Maximum students per session should be kept to 
roughly 30-50 employees to ensure adequate time and resources for knowledge transfer and any 
questions from the students.  Employees should be required to repeat the course once a year as 
part of their annual employee training schedule.  Such a course could be classroom-based either 
on or offsite of the organization.  Web-based training for such material was deemed 
unacceptable, since emphasis should be placed on face-to-face introductions of and interactions 
with the IT staff to the organization’s general population.  
 
An example agenda for such a training session can be found in Appendix C.  Additional sample 
questions to either ask users during the training or have them answer on their own can be found 
in Appendix D.  
 
  
42 
 
Audit Guidelines 
Implementing a strong set of policies and procedures and properly training personnel, does not 
mean an administrator’s network is now secure from social engineering attackers.  These new 
guidelines must be tested to ensure their effectiveness.  To ensure proper testing, appropriate 
auditing techniques must be used.  Since social engineering focuses less on the technology and 
more on the users of the technology, regular system security audits may not properly ensure 
quality social engineering attack protection.  Most security audits simply do not cover aspects of 
an organization that are vulnerable to social engineering attacks (Jones, 2003).  Current security 
audits should be modified, or new ones created, to deal with the issues surrounding social 
engineering. 
 
Audit Preparation 
Chris Jones (2003) states it is important that an audit focused on social engineering address four 
key items: 
• Define mission and objectives – focus the audit on important aspects within the 
organization. 
• Obtain permission – ensure proper trust between auditors and staff before any action is 
taken that can be seen as unauthorized activity. 
• Notify employees – ensure that auditors are not mistaken for legitimate social engineers.  
It should be noted that if the audit is being performed under the guise of a mock social 
engineering attack, only key employees (such as the systems administrators and 
department heads) should be notified beforehand. 
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• Review current policies and procedures – allows administrators to review current 
guidelines for accuracy and relevance and make comments or suggestions where 
appropriate. 
 
When deciding what information the audit will attempt to gather, administrators should also 
decide whether such information will be quantitative or qualitative (Manjak, 2006).  In most 
cases, administrators will seek a combination of both data types.  Some audit findings, such as 
password length and complexity, will be quantitative.  Other audit findings, such as users’ 
reactions to the audit process, will be qualitative. 
 
A proper audit for social engineering preparedness should be conducted under two methods: 
• Procedure review  
• Procedure testing  
 
Procedure review audits consisting of reviewing all policy and procedure documentation.  This 
audit can be performed by internal control auditors (with the help of the system administration 
staff).  While internal auditors may have the most knowledge about the inner workings of an 
organization, using outside auditors can be beneficial as they bring a unique perspective.  This 
audit should be seen as a good way of maintaining a current set of policies and procedures for all 
personnel to follow.  Information such as defining high priority systems and identifying access 
verification procedures, and breach response policies should all be reviewed and updated as 
needed.  No policy or procedure will help protect an organization’s assets if it is irrelevant to the 
organization’s physical and virtual configuration.   
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In addition to organizational relevance, no policy or procedure will protect an organization’s 
assets if the policies and procedures are not executed by the organization’s staff.  To ensure staff 
members are adhering to the organization’s best practices, procedure testing auditing is needed.  
To perform this type of audit correctly, outside, trusted auditors must be used,  , since this audit, 
in effect, conducts one or more social engineering attacks against the organization to gauge the 
effectiveness of the policies, procedures, or personnel preparedness.  Unlike the policy review 
audit, where it is permissible for other staff to be aware of the audit, this audit should be 
conducted with few people’s knowledge.  This faux attack will help expose any lapses in security 
policies and identify what personnel or resources are weak points real attackers may target.  An 
example audit attack can be found in Appendix F. 
 
Many organizations are leery of these types of audits, as it can be seen as a lack of trust in the 
organization’s staff by not informing them of such audits. To minimize the fear many 
organizations have to a social engineering attack simulation, conducting a survey may be a 
desirable alternate attack method rather than attempting a covert breach (Orgill, Romney, Bailey, 
& Orgill, 2004).  Properly conducted, surveys can prey on aspects such as friendliness and quid 
pro quo while being a variant of phishing for information.  An example of audit survey questions 
auditors can ask can be found in Appendix E.  A sample audit survey attack can be found in 
Appendix G. 
Audit Timeline 
A timetable should be established on when either type of audit should be conducted.  While the 
procedure review audit be scheduled at fixed intervals, either yearly or bi-yearly, the procedure 
testing audit should have a more flexible schedule.  Administrators can establish policies to 
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determine the number of testing audits to do per year, but they should not be on a fixed annual 
schedule.  This floating schedule will allow the audits to be more effective as users will not know 
exactly when to expect the audit(s).   
Example Audit 
Tony Greening (1996) provides a detailed example for a quick social engineering audit to 
demonstrate the power of impersonation mixed with exploiting authority roles.  For his test, 
Greening sent an email to college students asking them to email him their computer lab account 
passwords to verify their accounts because they had received word of an intruder accessing the 
network.  Out of the students who were believed to have read the email (estimated to be 291 
students), 175 replied.  Greening then took the passwords they emailed and compared them to 
their true computer lab account passwords.  Greening found that out of the 175 passwords 
collected, over 78% of them were legitimate.  Table 1 shows Greening’s breakdown of received 
passwords. 
 
Table 1 - Greening Responses (Greening, 2006, p.11) 
Password Type # of Replies 
Legitimate 138 
Possible 12 
Fake 18 
TOTAL 175 
              
This high percentage of correct passwords shows that while not all students were willing to 
divulge their true passwords, more than three fourths did so without any consideration as to who 
was sending the email and if the recipient could or should be trusted. 
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Conclusion 
Impact of Social Engineering 
Social engineering attacks can severely damage an individual’s or organization’s reputation and 
revenue very quickly (Gulati, 2003).  There have been numerous stories in the past years about 
unprotected laptops being stolen containing confidential or personal information such as social 
security numbers, credit card information, or health records.  Social engineering, to some degree, 
was used to obtain those devices either by people within the organization or by outside 
individuals eager to obtain any data they could.   
 
The concept of social engineering for deceitful purposes is nothing new nor is its application to 
gain access to computer systems and networks.  While it certainly is not a new avenue of attack, 
new methods of performing such attacks are being devised.  While no router or firewall will be 
100% hack proof, the stronger and more powerful these and other devices become, the more 
attackers will resort to alternate means to get their desired information.  Increasingly, attackers 
will resort to relatively low tech attack methods as technology continues to advance.  An attacker 
will look for the easiest method with the largest possible payoff and not spend countless hours 
trying to hack into a network appliance or server when engaging someone in conversation (in 
other words, hacking the person) will yield the same information in minutes. 
 
Social engineering attack attempts (regardless of the medium) will continue to increase if 
organizations continue to invest and focus solely on new technology to solve their IT security 
dilemmas.  Administrators must shift focus from the technology to the users of the technology 
that will help mitigate social engineering attacks.  From defining best practices to conducting 
thorough risk vs. threat analysis, administrators can arm themselves with the tools and 
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knowledge necessary to mitigate such attacks.  Administrators should not aim for a blanket “trust 
no one” approach to attack prevention, but they should always strive to keep in mind that, 
unfortunately, not everyone can be trusted.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Administrator’s Best Practices 
 
Physical Security Practices 
 Issue photo ID badges to all staff (combine with RFID or mag-stripe with user 
information) 
 Create policies around ID badges (e.g., uniform badge symbols, colors for 
department divisions, etc.) 
 Use biometric access if possible (e.g., fingerprint ID, hand scan, etc.) 
 Mandatory sign-in sheets for all visitors 
 Issue ID badges to all visitors 
 Install surveillance cameras and form retention period for recorded video 
 Install auto locking, ID required doors 
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Personnel Security Practices 
 Conduct staff training workshops to teach and review user best practices on a 
scheduled basis 
 Create confidentiality policy (e.g., what records are kept, who has access to 
records) 
- Disable systems administrator access to HR records so only essential 
personnel can access them  
 Keep a regularly updated list (including photos) of all personnel 
 Create policy to revoke user rights on user termination (e.g., disabling account, 
removing permissions, notifying employees of departure) 
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Digital Security Practices 
 Enforce complex password policies and password age policies (including 
administrator password(s)) 
 Establish firewall rules to lower the hacking risk   
 Block known malware websites 
 Filter for possible malware websites/pharming websites 
 Establish email filters to cut down on spam/phishing emails 
 Require multifactor authentication to all systems (e.g., username & password + 
RSA or other authentication tokens) 
 Encrypt sensitive data (e.g., databases, confidential emails, wireless 
transmissions) 
 Establish role-based access to provide for easier administration 
 
Audit Best Practices 
 Schedule yearly security audits to ensure best practices are being followed 
 Conduct mock attacks to check for vulnerabilities annually 
 Conduct legitimate surveys to gauge user’s knowledge and preparedness of 
attacks biannually  
 Conduct yearly cleanup of systems to expunge unused/obsolete accounts 
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Appendix B – Visitor Log Example 
 
BASIC EXAMPLE COMPANY VISITOR LOG 
Name Organization Guest of ___ Time in Time out Visitor badge 
ID # 
Visitor’s name Visitor’s 
organization 
Who is 
responsible for 
the visitor’s 
whereabouts* 
Time the visitor 
arrived 
Time the visitor 
left 
Badge number 
assigned to 
visitor 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
* Responsible party shall remain with guest at all times during their visit  
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Appendix C – User Workshop Agenda 
 
The following is a general agenda of topics and activities that should be covered in an employee 
workshop to ensure proper security awareness training to the staff: 
 
 Introduction of network and systems administration staff 
 Motivations for protecting organization’s information 
 What is at stake if information security and/or confidentiality is breached 
 Contacts for reporting potential breaches 
 Overview of policies and procedures 
   Password policies 
   Physical security policies 
   Guest admittance policies 
   Person verification practices 
 Importance of verification and authentication and personal/organizational/legal 
consequences of internal breach of policies and procedures 
 Overview of human conditions attackers will prey on 
  (e.g., commitment, social proof, friendliness) 
 Overview of tactics attackers may use 
  (e.g., phishing, impersonation, pre-texting) 
 Sample scenarios 
 Review of what was discussed/question and answer session 
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Appendix D – User Workshop Sample Questionnaire 
 
1. What is social engineering?         
            
  ____________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Name at least 3 human factors social engineers prey on and attempt to exploit?  
            
  ______________________________________________________  
 
3. Name at least 3 types of social engineering attacks      
            
   ______________________________________________________ 
 
4. What are at least 5 things you can do to protect yourself from social engineering attacks? 
            
            
    ________________________________________________ 
 
5. Why is protecting the organization’s information relevant to you?    
            
            
  ______________________________________________________  
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6. Who should you contact (name & phone number) if you feel someone is trying to use 
social engineering on you to gain information?      
     __________________________________________ 
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Appendix E – Sample Procedure Review Audit Form 
 
 What are the current password policy settings for the domain (including password 
age/complexity/length)? 
 List of users with domain admin rights 
 List of users with database admin rights 
 List of all servers that manage financial/personal/proprietary information 
 List of users with access to financial/personal/proprietary information systems 
 Current firewall rules 
 Current network access rules 
 List of users with physical access to server room 
 List of all current employees with photo ID 
 
 Visitor logs kept since prior audit 
 
 Log of all potential breaches reported to security team 
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Appendix F – Sample Procedure Testing Audit 
 
Basic Sample Attack Scenarios 
Auditor 
Name 
Name used Contact name & title Information Desired Description of Events 
auditor 1 John Smith 
Sara: Systems 
Analyst 
User's username: 
  User's password: 
Manager's contact info: 
auditor 2 Larry Jones Tom: accountant 
User's username: 
  User's password: 
Manager's contact info: 
auditor 3 
Julie 
Meadows 
Gregg: paralegal 
User's username: 
  User's password: 
Manager's contact info: 
auditor 4 Mike Richards 
Johanna: junior sales 
associate 
User's username: 
  User's password: 
Manager's contact info: 
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Appendix G – Sample Audit: Survey Method 
 
Cover story: new systems administrator conducting survey for head administrator.   
Does not want to let new manager down with this task to complete network usage survey. 
 
Name Username 
Last time 
changed 
password 
Last password 
used 
Current 
password 
length 
Title Department 
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